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Apr. 28. 1950.1

R. C. LITTLE et ai., Appellants, v. MOUNTAIN VIEW
DAIRIES. INC. (a Corporation), ResPQJldent.
[1] Appeal-Orders Appealable-Order on Motion for Judgment
on Pleadings.-An order granting a motion for judgment on
the pleadings is not final or appealable, and it is only from
the subsequently entered judgment that an appeal will lie.
[2] Ootenancy-Use of Property-Oharge for Drilling and Operating Expenses.-If one cotenant produces oil, he is entitled to
charge the interests of nonproducing cotenants for their proportionate share of drilling and operating expenses.
[3] Id.-Lease by Ootenant.-A cotenant by ratifying an oil and
gas lease by his cotenant, under which the expense incurred
by the owners of the mineral rights in producing the oil from
the land was represented by five-sixths of the oil that the lessee
retained from the total production, agreed that this was a fair
charge for the expense of bringing the oil to the surface.
[4J Oll-Sale or Grant.-A grant of a fraction of all the oil in and
under the land "and which may hereafter be produced nnd
saved" creates, in the absence of extrinsic evidence or other
controlling language in the deed, an expense-bearing mineral
fee interest rather than an expense-free royalty interest.

[1] See 2 Oal.Jur. 157; 2 Am.Jur. 897.
[2J Basis of computation of cotenant's accountability for minerals removed from property, note, 5 A.L.R.2d 1368, 1380.
[4J See 8 Oal.Jur.l0-Yr. Supp. (1948 Rev.) 616: 24 Am.Jur. 529.
McX. Dig. References,; [1] Appeal and Error, § 42; [2] Cotenancy,§ 19; [3J Cotenancy, § 31; [4] Oil, §12.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange
County and from an order denying plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting that of defendant. Franklin G. West, Judge. Judgment rever.sedj appeal from order
dismissed.
Action for declaratory relief. Judgment for defendant reversed.
Dolley, Knight, Woods & Hightower and Arthur B. Knight
for Appellants.

Richard.A. Grant, Warren S. Pallette, PaulA. Lower, S. E.
Cavanaugh, L. R. Seaman, Rush M.. Blodget, Alfred W.
Mitchem and Gordon A. Goodwin as Amici Curiae on behalf
: of Appellants..
~.)

.r','
~ -;~

L~

Joseph A. Ball and E. P. Mulholland for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-ln 1935 plainti1fs' predecessors in interest

'fu certain real property granted to defendant a limited interfest in that property described as "Eight and one-third per

I

• ceJ;lt (8-% %) of all oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances.
,
minerals, in, under and/or which may be hereaftf'r proand saved fr(~Ul" thE> property. In 1945 plaintiffs leased
property to Loren L, Hillman, Inc., for the purpose of
tJ)lrodluCl·lng oil and gas. The lease reserved to plaintiffs as
a royalty of one-sixth of all oil produced and saved
the premises. The lease also provided in part as follows:
10. In ease said Lessor owns a less interest in the above
M&.......,.. u".... lands than· the entire and undivided fee simple
therein, then the royalties and rentals herein provided
shall be paid the said Lessor only in the proportion which
ilAlJ,Plltel~est bears to the whole undivided fee.
Lessor agrees that in no event shall Lessee be
to pay greater rents or royalties than provided in
•lease and Lessor further agrees that Lessor will fully
fjj1tisfy and discharge any and all of the obligations and refDI~eme:nts. under [the deed to defendant] insofar as the above
l]jI~ibeid land and the production therefrom is concerned. And
_1IIIIl!1" further agrees to protect Lessee against any expense,
U81rna,re arising as a result of claims or rights asserted by
under said deed above referred to."
:f~I1ldaJ[lt did not sign the lease but executed a separate
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document attached thereto, which reads as follows: "The
within Oil and Gas Lease is hereby ratified, approved and
confirmed. "
The present controversy is over the proportions in which
plaintiffs and defendant shall' share the one-sixth (16% % )
royalty payable by the lessee under the lease. Plaintiffs by
their complaint for declaratory relief claimed that they were
entitled to eleven-twelfths of the royalty. Defendant answered
and cross-complained, claiming one-twelfth of all the oil produced or 50 per cent of the royalty. Each party moved for
judgment on the pleadings, and the court decided in favor of
defendant and entered its judgment accordingly. Plaintiffs
have appealed from the minute order granting defendant's
motion and denying theirs, and from the judgment. [1] It
is settled that an order granting a motion for judgment on
the pleadings is not final or appealable, and that it is only
from the subsequently entered judgment that an appeal will
lie. (Holton v. Noble, 83 Cal. 7, 9 [23 P. 58]; Montgomery
Ward &- 00. v. Welch, 17 Cal.App.2d 127, 129 [61 P.2d 790);
Overton v. White, 18 Cal.App.2d 567, 568-569 [64 P.2d 758,
65 P.2d 99] ; Code Civ. Proc., § 963.) Accordingly, the appeal
from the order must be dismissed.
Before the oil and gas lease was executed, plaintiffs and
defendant were tenants in common in the exclusive right to
drill for and produce oil from the land. (Se.e Dabney-Johnston Oil Oorp. v. Walden,4 Ca1.2d 637, 649 [52 P.2d 237}.}
Their respective interests were defined by the grant deed from
plaintiffs' predecessors in interest to defendant. If, as plaintiffs contend, the deed conveyed no more than a one-twelfth
interest in the grantors' mineral rights, their interests were
in'the ratio of eleven to one.
[2] It is settled that if one eotenant produces oil, he is entitled to charge the interests of non producing cotenants for
their proportionate share of drilling and operating expenses.
(Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden,4 Ca1.2d 637, 657 [52
P.2d 237J ; see, also, McOord v. Oakland Q. M. 00., 64 Cal.
134, 148-149 [27 P. 863,49 Am.Rep. 686] ; anno., 5 A.L.R.2d
1368, 1380.) [3] In this case the expense incurred by the owners of the mineral rights in producing the oil from the land is
represented by the five-sixths of the oil that the lessee retains
from the total production. By ratifying the lease defendant
agreed that this is a fair charge for the expense of bringing
the oil to the surface. (Gill v. Bennett, (Tex.Civ.App.) 59
S.W.2d 473, 475; Texas &- Pacific Ooal &- Oil 00. v. Kirtley,

)

Apr. 1950]

LITTLE V. MOUNTAIN VIEW DAIRIES

235

[35 C.M 232; 217 P.2d 418]

(Tex.Civ.App.) 288 S.W. 619,622.) "If a lease be executed
by a cotenant, the nonconsenting cotenants may recognize the
lease and receive their fractional interest in the royalty, or
they may reject the lease, and receive their fractional part
of the oil produced, less their proportionate part of the cost
of discovery and production." (Davis T. Atlantic Oil Producing Co., 87 F.2d 75, 77.)
Section 10 of the lease provides for the payment to plaintiffs of that proportion of rentals and royalties that their interest bears to the whole undivided fee in the real property.
Section 10-a of the lease does not increase the sharE' of the
royalties to which defendant would otherwise be entitled.
That section merely binds plaintiffs to "satisfy and discharge
any and all obligations and requirements under" the deed to
defendant. It does not purport to state what those obligations
are. Accordingly, it is necessary to determine whether the
deed conveyed only one-twelfth of the mineral rights. or on
the contrary, as defendant contends, it conveyed an expensefree or royalty interest that would entitle defendant to onetwelfth of the oil produced free of any cost of production.
[4] Defendant contends that the addition of the words
"and which may hereafter be produced and saved" to a grant
of a fraction of all the oil in and nnder the land clearly evidence an intent that the interest granted should be expense
free. It has been generally held. however. that a grant of a
fraction of all "of the oil. gas and other minerals in and
tinder. I1nd that may be produced" from the land creates an
~xpense-bearing mineral fee interest rather than an expensefree royalty intereRt. (Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392 [185
~.W.2d 563,564-5651 . Watkins v. Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179 [189
S.W.2d 699, 700] ; Jones v. Bedford, (Tex.Civ.App.) 56 S.W.
~ 305; .GiU v. Bennett, (Tex.Civ.App.)59 S.W.2d 473, 475;
\llinkle v. Gauntt, Okla. i{206 P.2d 1001, 1005J;
~anlell v. Boling, 186 Okla. 59 [96 P.2d 30, 31-32] ; 8hinn v.
1f1i%ton, 154 F.2n 629, 631-635; see, also, Brook, v. Mull, 147
740 [78 P.2d 879. 883].) When there is an existing oil
at the time the lessor executes a mineral deed, it is not
~.CO!nmlOn for the deed to grant not only a given fraction of
the oil in, under, and that may be produced from the land,
. also the same fractional interest in the royalties payable
the lease. (See 3 Summers, Oil and Gas [Perm. ed.],
p. 502.) If the first claus(' of such a deed were conas creating an expense-free royalty interest, it would
the stated fraction of the total production rather tIw:a
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the stated fraction of the landowner's royalty reserved under
the lease, and would therefore be inconsistent" with the second
clause. It has been held, however, that such deeds are not
internally inconsistent and that the grant of the stated fraction of the royalties under the existing lease is merely a statement of the legal effect of granting the same fraction of all
the oil in, under and that may be produced from the land.
(Shinn v. Buxton, 154 F.2d 629, 631-635; Richardson v. Bart,
143 Tex. 392 [185 S.W.2d 563, 564-565].)
It is contended that because of differences in the applicable theories of oil and gas rights, authorities from other
jurisdictions are of no value in interpreting the language of
a grant of mineral rights in California land. There is nothing,
however, in the theory of oil and gas rights in California to
cause this court to reject the interpretation that has been
adopted by the courts of other states in construing language
similar to that in the deed in this case. California has rejected
the theory of ownership of oil and gas in piact' (Callahan v.
Martin, 3 Cal.2d 110, 118 [43 P.2d 788, 101 A.L.R. 871J),
and language in a grant referring to oil to be produced would
therefore have less significance in determining the expensefree or expt'nse-bearing nature of the interest created than
similar langnage in a deed dealing with land in a state, such
as Texas, where the theory of title to oil and gas in place has
been retained. (Richardson v. Hart. 143 Tex. 392 [185
S.W.2d 563, 564J.) In California the parties might well doubt
the effectiveness of a conveyance limited to a fraction of all
the oil and gas in and under the land and thereforp add a
reference to oil to be produced, without in any way mtending
to convey more than the stated fraction of all the oil rights
appurtenant to the land. (See Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp•.
v. Walden. 4 CaI.2d 637. 648-649 [52' P .2d 2371.)
Furthermore, the decision in Dabney-John.don Oil Corpv.
Walden, 4 Ca1.2d 637 [52 P .2d 237]. indicates that the addition of the words "which may be hereafter produced and
saved" after a grant of a fraction of all of the oil in and
under the land does not have the e/fpct of creating an expensefree interest. In that case t.here was a grant of "a two per
cent in said land owners royalty of all gas. oil and other
hydrocarbon substances to be produced and saved and sold
from said rlescribed land.
.. The interest was described
as a royalty interest. and in holdin~ it expense-free. the court
reasoned that since the 2 per cent interest had been carved
from the land owner's 27lh percent expense-free royalty
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under an existing lease, it would necessarily be implied that
after the termination of the lease, the 2 per cent interest remained expense-free. It placed no reliance on the words "to
be produced and saved and sold from said described land,"
pointing out that the quoted language was inserted for another
purpose than to indicate how the expenses were to be allocated. It was contended that under the deed the grantee
was entitled to royalties only if a lessee was producing oil,
not if another cotenant was producing it. In answering this
contention the court said, "That the parties in the instant
case did not contemplate that a single producing tenant should
retain the entire output is indicated by the stipulation of facts
and the reforming clause added to the assignment, which expressly provide that the rights of the assignees extend not only
to oil within and beneath the land, but to all oil and other
hydrocarbon substances produced and saved from the land,
however said substances should be produced." (4 Cal.2d at
657.) It is clear, therefore, that in California as in other jurisdictions, in the absence of extrinsic evidence or other controlling language in the deed, a grant of a fraction of all the
oil in, under and that may be produced and saved from the
land creates an expense-bearing mineral fee interest.
Barnard v. Jamison, 78 CaLApp.2d 136 [177 P.2d 341],
does not support a contrary result. In that case the grant
deed contained a clause that specifically provided what expenses the fractional interests conveyed should bear; and the
; court properly held that this clause was determinative of the
issue.
~.. The appeal from the order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings is dismissed. The judgment is reversed.

)

Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
.. ·SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In December, 1935, the then
OWnell'S of the involved land executed and delivered to defendan instrument entitled "Grant Deed," in which it is det.,.areiQ that such owners" do hereby grant to [defendant] . . .
and one-third per cent (81f.3%) of all oil, gas and other
substances, and minerals, in, under/or which
be hereafter produced and saved from" such land. In
L&1IlUrlAT.. 1936, the land was conveyed to plaintiffs, with the
!ilI:nre8R exception of the percentage interest in the oil, gas and
minerals which had theretofore been transferred to deBy reason of the earlier conveyance and the expresa

)
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exception it is obvious that plaintiti's never acquired more than
91% per cent of the oil and mineral rights. In February,
1945, plaintiti's, as lessors, entered into an oil lease covering
the property. The lease provides for a % (16%%) landowner's royalty payable to plaintiti's and expressly requires
of plaintiffs that (Par. 10-a) "in no event shall Lessee be
required to pay greater rents or royalties than provided in this
lease and Lessor [plaintiff's] further agrees that LessOt' will
fully satisfy and discharge any and all of the obligations and
requirements under that certain Deed [to defendant, of its
percentage interest in the oil, gas and other minerals] . . .
insofar as the above described land and the production therefrom is concerned." Defendant did not sign the lease as a
lessor and is not named as such. Its character or relationship,
as being distinct from that of cotenant lessor, is indicated by
the provision above quoted and by the fact that under date
of March 1, 1945, it executed a writing attached to the lease
which reads: "The within Oil and Gas Lease is hereby ratified, approved and confirmed." Obviously, the defendant, by
the terms of the lease, by the substance of its endorsement
thereon, and by the language of the original conveyance to it,
is not a mere cotenant lessor. It is the owner of what heretofore in California has been termed a royalty interest-()f 8~
per cent of "all" oil and gas which may be "produced and
saved" from the land. The lessee has "produced and saved"
oil and gas from the demised premises and the sole question is:
Is defendant entitled to 8~ per cent of all the" produced and
saved" oil and gas or only to 8~ per cent of that share of the
_ oil and gas (%) which plaintiti's as lessors reserved in their
lease agreement with the producers'
The trial court accepted the language of the conveyance to
defendant and adjudged that the defendant owns 8~ per
cent of all "oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances and
minerals in, under and/or which have heretofore or may hereafter be produced and saved" from the land; that defendant
is entitled to receive that percentage of the total production;
and that plaintiff's "shall account to and pay over to the defendant ... the proceeds from the sale of 8%% of 100% of"
the total production. Plaintiffs urge, however, and the majority now hold, that defendant is entitled not to 8% per
cent of all the oil and gas "produced and saved" from the
premises, but only to 8~ per cent of one-sixth of the oil and
gas so produced and saved. This startling TPlmlt is accomplished by holding that the conveyance to defendant did not
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give it a royalty interest in the oil but that it is 8 'tenant in
common of land or mineral rights in fee with plaintiffs and
is entitled merely to a share of their lessors' royalty.
In support of the majority position it is argue& that the
language of the conveyance to defendant creates a fee interest
in minerals, rather than a royalty interest; that, therefore,
under the holdings of certain cases from other states, construing various contracts and conveyances, defendant should
be held entitled to no more than 8% per cent of the plaintiffs'
}i lease royalty; and, further, that as a cotenant holder of a
"fee interest" in the oil and gas rights to the land, as well as
by reason of defendant's ratification of the lease, defendant
should pay its Hproportion of drilling and operation expenses"
(see Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden (1935), 4 Ca1.2d
637,657 f52 P.2d 2371) and should share in royalties under
the lease on the property in the same proportion that· its ., fee
interest bears to the total fee interest." I am satisfied that
upon the law as heretofore established in California such position is untenable. This court bas definitely rejected the theory
that the transfer of fractional oil rights in land constitutes
a transfer of a fee interest in the oil, and bas held that in
this state the transferee of such rights receives a royalty interest; i. e., an interest in real property in the nature of an
incorporeal hereditament, which he holds as a cotenant with
, the other owners of oil rights in the same land. (See Callahan
v. Martin (1935), 3 Ca1.2d 110, 125, 126 [43 P.2d 788. 101
: A.L.R. 871] ; Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden (1935),
supra, 4 Ca1.2d637, 649, 650, 654: Schiffman v. Richfield 0,,7,
'Co. (1937),8 Ca1.2d 211, 223-224 164 P.2d 1081) • l.a Laguna
Ranch Co. v. Dodge (1941), 18 Ca1.2d 132, 135 [114 P.2d 351,
~185A.L.R. 546] ; Tanner v. Title Ins. <t Trust Co. (1942). 20
:Cal.2d 814, 819-820 (129 P.2d 383J; Tanner v. Olds (1946),
29 Cal.2d 110, 116 [173 P.2d 6,167 A.L.R. 12191.)
Plaintiffs concede that if the parties to a conveyance .. in·tended the conveyance to be of a royalty interest, it is genet"ally held that the grantee takes what may be termed a nODexpense bearing interest, or a net interest in the royalty reServed in any lease on the land." As pointed out in the Dabney-Johnston case, at page 653, the "language of a grant is
~; be construed most strongly against the grantor" (see, also,
p,iv. Code, § 1069; Beam v. Duggan (1933), 132 Cal.App. 546,
~ [23 P.2d 581) and (p. 657), "where cotenancy interests
",vebeen sold with the understanding and agreement that

L
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they shall not be subject to such charge [for a proportion of
drilling and operation expense], but that other units shall
bear the full expense of production . . . such agreement of
the parties, express or necessarily implied [is controlling]."
Here the grant to defendant unequivocally specifies that defendant is to receive 8% per cent of •• all oil, gas . . . which
may be hereafter produced and saved from" the land involved,
and no mention or provision is made of a requirement that
defendant pay, or be charged with, a share of the cost of production, or any other debit agaiust his interest, under a lease
for oil development which might subsequently be executed
by the grantor or his successors in title. It would seem that,
as commented by the court in Barnard v. Jamison (1947), 78
Cal.App.2d 136, 141 [177 P.2d 341], "the words of conveyance .•. could not be plainer."
Moreover, it does not appear that by "ratifying, approving
and confirming" the lease, defendant agreed to be charged
with any part of the lessee's share in the production. By
paragraph 10-a of the lease, quoted in material part hereinabove, plaintiffs expressly agreed to fully satisfy and discharge the obligation to pay over to defendant the latter's
royalty share in the oil and gas produced. Consequently, it
seems only reasonable to conclude that, as impliedly found
by the trial court, defendant's ratification of the lease constituted no more than a consent that the lessee named therein
should proceed with oil d~velopment upon the condition,
plicitly set forth in the lease, that defendant's rights be fully
satisfied and discharged. Defendant's royalty interest comes
not from the lease but was created and is measured by the
original landowner's conveyance.
Plaintiffs rely upon cases from other states l in which it
was held that the landowner's royalty to be paid under an oil
and gas lease should be divided between cotenants in proportion to their interests in the land or the minerals. However,
those cases differ from ours in language of the conveyances
involved, in circumstances under which the leases were made,
and in the accepted legal theories of oil and gas rights which
were applied, and consequently they are of doubtful assistance
here.
Plaintiffs argue that judgment on the pleadings was Un-

ex-

'See Mafllell v. Boling (1939), 186 Ok1&. 59 [96 P.2d 30, 31-32];
Swearingen v. Oldham (1945), 195 Okla. 532 [159 P.2d 247, 250]; Murph71 v. Dilworth (1941), 137 TeL 32 [151 S.W.2d 1004, 1006]; RichardeOA v. Harf (1945), 143 TeL 392 [185 S.W.2d 563, 564-566]; 8hi. . 1'.

B _ _ (lNG.lO o.O.A.). 154 F.2d 629, 632-633.
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proper because "the complaint for declaratory relief in this
instance clearly stated a cause of action" (see Seeger v. OdeU
(1941), 18 Cal.2d 409, 412 [115 P.2d 977, 136 A.L.R. 1291] ;
Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945), 26 Ca1.2d 149,
151 [157 P.2d 1] ; Columbia Pictures Corp. v. De Toth (1945),
26 Ca1.2d 753, 760 [161 P.2d 217, 162 A.L.R. 747]), and plaintiffs "have not had an opportunity to prove the allegations .
in their complaint. They should not be denied their day in
court unless the deed to )fountain View Dairies, Inc. so clearly
constitutes an assignment of landowner's royalty that no other
construction upon such deed is possible." It is to be noted,
however, that the deed to defendant, as well as the oil lease
here involved, were relied on by both parties and were pleaded
in full by defendant in its cross-complaint. In their open·
ing brief plaintiffs assert that "The primary question for
determination . . . is whether, under the pleadings, the deed
and the lease here involved, )fountain View Dairies, Inc., is
entitled to 8Ya% or 50% of the landowner's royalty . . . " In
their notice of motion for judgment on the pleadings plaintiffs
solemnly declare that "Said motion will be made as to said
cross-complaint upon the ground that no material issue of fMt
is presented by the cross-cOIp.plaint and answer thereto but on
the contrary that the only is.'lue presented is one at law, to-wit,
the legal interpretations of the" deed and the lease. (Italics
added.) The declaratory judgment sought by each of the
parties hereto involved the interpretation of the same instru~ menta upon the same pleadings, and was rendered by the
'. court. Under such circumstances plaintiffs are not entitled,
when the judgment went against them, to now assert that int terpretation of either the deed or the lease presents a questim
f of fact, rather than of law, and that the judgment should not
Lhave been rendered on the pleadings alone..

)

. •. .'...' For the reasons above stated, I would affirm the judgme It
appealed from.

~

': Carter, l., eoneurred.
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